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THE FEDERAL AID TO PRIVATE SCHOOL
CONTROVERSY: A LOOK
Walter A. Rafalko*
...

.[I]

t is the responsibility of lawmakers in creating, and the

courts in interpreting the law, to take cognizance of and keep pace
with the march of social progress and adapt the law to social needs
insofar as that may be done within the framework of our Constitution and statutory law."
Crockett, J., dissenting in
Nasfell v. Ogden City, 122
Utah 344, 249 P. 2d 507,
512 (1952).
INTRODUCTION
Pressure for federal aid to education still continues and, by certain
organized groups, the pressure is on especially for aid to private
schools. The subject of federal aid to private schools has created
confusion and uncertainty because of the fact that so much has been
written by legal scholars but actually so little has been adjudicated
by the United States Supreme Court. Indubitably, the limited number
of such adjudications may, in part, be explained by the doctrine prevailing in the federal courts that a federal taxpayer, as such, has no
standing to argue that a federal statute is unconstitutional. Thus,
until additional cases are adjudicated by the United States Supreme
Court establishing more definite guidelines, confusion and Congressional indecisiveness in this area will continue to reign supreme. This
may also explain away, in part, why more heat than light has been
cast upon this subject matter.
Necessarily, this article prescinds from the principle that Congress
has the power to enact a bill appropriating funds to public schools
under the "general welfare" clause of the United States Constitution.
(art. I, § 8, cl. 1.) Today, the scope of that Congressional power has
* B.S., St. Louis University; LL.B., Boston University; LL.M., Georgetown
University. Member of the District of Columbia, Missouri, Pennsylvania and U.S.
Supreme Court Bars. Professor of Law, Duquesne University.
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been so broadly defined by decisions of the Supreme Court that few
persons would seriously question that federal aid could be given to
the public schools. Little purpose, at this point, would be served by
reviewing the controversy which rages in regard to the Congressional
power under the "taxing and spending" clause of the United States
Constitution or to refer to the recent decisions involving social
security aspects, such as unemployment insurance and old-age benefit
statutes, which have been upheld under the aforementioned general
welfare power. It is well to note, however, that the first Congressional grants to the states for the purpose of education antedated the
present United States Constitution; that grants for educational purposes have been made from time to time; and, because of the dire
need for school funds by some of the states, grants will continue to
be made by Congress in the future.
The purpose of this article is, therefore, concerned exclusively with
the study of federal aid to private, non-profit, or sectarian schools, at
the primary and secondary levels, and not with aid to public schools.
This article will briefly consider: the history of the "establishment
of religion" clause and how this clause is currently interpreted by
the Court; some of the current federal statutes conferring benefits
upon private schools; the various forms of aids which may be given
to private schools; the right of a child or parent to select a private
school, if he wishes; the various theories justifying or opposing federal aid to private schools, and will attempt to analyze some of the
decisions which have a significant bearing on the subject under study.
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION CLAUSE
The most significant constitutional limitations that touch upon any
proposed governmental aid to education are: the establishment of
3
religion clause;1 the free exercise clause; 2 the due process clauses;
and the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. 4
The most important limitation appears to be the first amendment of
the Constitution of the United States of America, which provides, in
part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; . . ." This amend-

ment currently brings into focus the two most important problems in
the Church-State relationship. On the one hand, how may church1.

U.S. Const. amend. I.

2.

Ibid.

3.
4.

U.S. Const. amend. V and XIV, § 1.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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related educational institutions be compensated for the secular instruction taught therein without violating the "establishment of
religion" clause and, on the other hand, how may the public-supported
educational institutions teach some religious values which have been
taught heretofore without offending the "free exercise" clause? To
date, no denominational group is satisfied with the status quo.
Upon careful observation, one notes that the original limitations in
the first amendment were intended only to apply to Congress and not
to the states. 5 Today the entire first amendment now applies to the
states, 6 as well, and is embodied within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment, passed in 1868, which provides, in part: "....

nor shall

any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; . . ."7
What was the history of the "establishment of religion" status
prior to 1791, the year in which the first amendment of the Bill of
Rights was adopted? The Congregational Church was the tax-supported and state-established religion in several Northern colonies.
The Episcopal Church was the established religion with supporting
taxes in several Southern colonies, including Virginia. 8
In 1784, some Protestant clergymen in Virginia sought to extend
state support to religion with the passage of the Assessment Bill. At
this point Madison composed his Memorial and Remonstrance and
indicated that any financial support of religion was antithetical to
freedom of conscience. Madison termed any tax support "an establishment of religion," and considered any compulsory contribution to
religion through taxes as a violation of the individual's religious
liberty. He, therefore, defeated Patrick Henry and his advocates
sponsoring the Assessment Bill. 9 Thomas Jefferson, however, introduced a bill "for establishing religious freedom" and this was adopted.
On January 1, 1802, Thomas Jefferson wrote his famous letter to
the Danbury Baptist Association in Connecticut, in which he stated:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies
solely between man and his God; that he owes account to
5. Permoli v. First Municipality of New Orleans, 3 How. (44 U.S.) 589
(1845).
6. Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
7. See note 4 supra.
8. Taylor, Equal Protection of Religion: Today's Public School Problem,
38 A.B.A.J. 277, 278 (1952).
9. Moehlman, The Wall of separation: The Law and the Facts,38 A.B.A.J.
281, 283 (1952).
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none other for his faith or worship; that the legislative
powers of the government reach actions only, and not
opinions - I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act
of the whole American people which declared that their
legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus
building a wall of separation between church and State. 10
It is well to note that Jefferson's metaphor on "separation between
church and State" appears for the first time eleven years after the
first amendment had been ratified by the states in 1791.
In Everson v. Board of Education, 1 the United States Supreme
Court was called upon to consider the scope and applicability of the
metaphor to the states. As a result of this decision, two schools of
thought have emerged: (1) The first amendment must be given a
broad interpretation and its intent was not merely to prohibit the
establishment of a state church but to preclude any governmental aid
to religious groups or dogmas. 1 2 (2) The first amendment must be
given a narrow interpretation and its intent is not to prohibit nonpreferential governmental aid to all religions. ' 3 Thus, varying views
on the historic meaning of the "establishment of religion" clause
still persists. Regardless of what method is used to determine the
intent of this clause, the historical argument will continue to remain
inconclusive. As one writer states:
Not only is the historical argument inconclusive, but it
may be actually dangerous to full protection of liberty if it
is used to limit that freedom. The Founding Fathers were
novices in the field of religious freedom, for they had come
from a background of bigotry and lived in an era of intolerance. Religious tests for voting, holding public office, performing jury service, and testifying in court were wide10.

Id. at 284.

11. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
12. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM (1953); Pfeffer, Church
and State: Something Less than Separation, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1951); Konvitz, Separation of Church and State: The First Freedom, 14 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 44 (1949). Note, Public Aid to Establishments of Religion, 96 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 230 (1947); Comment, 21 So. Cal. L. Rev. 61 (1947).
13.

O'NEIL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

(1949); Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 3 (1949); Fahy, Religion, Education and the Supreme Court, 14 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 73 (1949); MeikelJohn, Educational Cooperation between
Church and State, 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 61 (1949); Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 23 (1949); Weclew, Church and State:
How Much Separation, 10 DePaul L.J. 1 (1960).
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spread in the various states and were undoubtedly accepted
by most of those who ratified the Bill of Rights. It would be
a strange comment on the flexibility of our democratic government, if after 150 years of growth our concepts of freedom were limited to the narrow horizons of our forefathers.
The First Amendment, if it is to keep step with the times,
must give much wider protection than it did in 1789.14
As another commentator on the inconclusiveness of the historical
argument points out:
Without challenging in any way the Court's questionable
transference of the establishment standard to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, one must nevertheless
discern that the functions which will now be performed by
the First Amendment in this are vastly different from its
functions as originally conceived. Whatever the philosophies
of the men who drafted and achieved the adoption of the
Amendment, no doubt exists that its first application was
merely as a principle of federalism. The most superficial investigation of the discussion in the various state conventions
to ratify the Constitution, and a perusal of the legislative
history of the Amendment itself, clearly indicate by the lack
of extended discussion that the Amendment did not purport
to set out any national consensus upon a full and detailed
theory of church-state relationships. Indeed it was because
the states still maintained their enormous powers to determine how religion and government should stand toward each
other, that the amendment to neutralize interference by the
new government seemed relatively uncontroversial. 1 5
In the area of church-state conflict of policy the United States Supreme Court should take a commonsense approach to the problem.' 6
There is nothing in the separation principle which precludes the state
from making a reasonable accommodation of its program to fit the
needs and purposes of religious education, especially in an area
where the predominant sentiment of the community should be permitted to govern. The task of the court is to identify the competing
interest, weigh and appraise them carefully, and in the process of
14. Summers, The Sources and Limits of Religious Freedom, 41 1l. L. Rev.
53, 57 (1946).
15. Dunsford, The Establishment Syndrome and Religious Liberty, 2
Duquesne U. L. Rev. 139, 163 (1964).
16. Kauper, Church, State and Freedom: A Review, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 829
(1954).
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judging allow great discretion to the legislature in the choice of the
interest to be served. As a leading authority stated:
The wall-of-separation metaphor is hardly apt as a description of this relationship. A wall necessitates complete separation, but complete separation of religion and government is
not supported by history, logic or common sense. Moreover,
the separation terminology is not found in the First Amendment, but is a convenient form of verbal shorthand to
express the two explicit restraints stated in the Constitution
in favor of the free exercise of religion and against an establishment of religion.17
While there seems to be some doubt as to the overriding purpose of
the first amendment, it appears to be clear that the states sought to
prohibit Congress from establishing a national church, as existed in
England, and to create a, preferred status for any religious sect. In
Bradford v. Roberts,i 8 the Supreme Court, moreover, noted that "a
law respecting a religious establishment" was "not synonmous with
that [language] used in the Constitution" which was a law "respecting an establishment of religion."
Today, it is abundantly clear that the due process clause forbids
state action which would effectuate "an establishment of religion"
prohibited by the first amendment.' 9 Yet there is nothing in the
language itself expressly indicating that church-oriented or parochial
schools which perform secular functions are prohibited from receiving compensation or reimbursement from the society which benefits
most by the services these schools render.
Furthermore, in addition to the foregoing due process arguments, it
is necessary to keep the equal protection guaranty of the fourteenth
amendment in mind, which requires that all children similarly situated
must be treated alike in the sharing of state welfare benefits. A state
should not exclude nor deny benefits of a personal nature to a child
merely because an incidental benefit might accure to an institution
that is prohibited from directly receiving state aid. 2 0 No child should
be denied a share in the benefits of welfare legislation merely because
of his religious beliefs--either by restraint or penalty.
17.

Id. at 845.

18.

175 U.S. 291, 297 (1899).

19.

See note 10 supra.

20. Blum, Religious Liberty and Bus Transportation,30 Notre Dame Lawyer 384 (1955).
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The child or his parent must have a true choice to select his school
without recrimination because of his religious convictions. As one
writer stated:
Let me illustrate by a fictional example. The duty of the
State to provide help in times of famine and depression is
obvious. Now if, in such a situation, the government breadlines were set up to distribute only pork, the intention might
be to provide aid to all citizens who need it, but actually a
religious qualification would attach to that aid. We might
say that anyone could come if he wished; if he did not, that
was his own affair. But I do not think Americans would be
satisfied that we were doing justice to the conscience of the
Orthodox Jew. I think we would spontaneously demand that
provision be made for the Jewish conscience. For the same
reason, I believe that, as Americans, we should spontaneously demand that an education aid arrangement be made
that takes into account the other fellow's conscience as well
as our own. Fundamental American principles would make
us take this stand! Public welfare benefits, whether educational or non-educational, should be realistically available
to all American children without regard to their religion or
21
lack of religion.
RIGHT TO ATTEND PRIVATE SCHOOLS
Do parents have the right to send their children to church-related
schools or does the state have a monopoly on education? This discussion involves the "free exercise" clause of the Constitution 22 and is
closely related to the question whether state aid may be given to
sectarian schools. The question was resolved in the classic Meyer
v. Nebraska2 3 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters2 4 cases. In Meyer
v. Nebraska, supra, the State of Nebraska passed a statute which
made it a crime to teach in any private, denominational, parochial or
public school any modern language, other than English, to any child
who had not attained and successfully passed the eighth grade.
Meyer, while an instructor in the parochial school, was convicted
under the statute of teaching the German language to a child. The
Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the conviction as a reasonable
21. Henle, American Principles and Religious Schools, 3 St. Louis U. L.J.
237, 246 (1955).
22. See note 1 supra.
23. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
24. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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exercise of the police power. The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed this decision, holding that the statute as applied
violated the rights of the teacher and invaded the liberty guaranteed
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and exceeds
the power of the state. The Court said:
Evidently the legislature has attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modern language teachers, with the
opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge and with the
power of parents to control the education of their children.....
That the State may do much, go very far indeed, in order to
improve the quality of its citizens physically, mentally and
morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental
2
rights which must be respected. 5
The significant point of the Meyer case is that the states do not
have the absolute power to prescribe the curricula of the churchrelated schools.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra, the State of Oregon passed a
compulsory education act which, with certain exemptions, required
every parent, guardian or other person having control of a child between the ages of eight and sixteen years to send him to the public
school district where he resided for the school years. Failure to
comply with this statute made such person guilty of a misdeamenor.
The Court held that the statute was unreasonable interference with
the liberty of the parents and guardian to direct the upbringing of the
children and thus violated the due process clause or the fourteenth
amendment, citing Meyer v. Nebraska, supra. The Supreme Court
stated:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of
the State to standardize its children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is
not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. 2 6
This case clearly indicates the parents may send their children to
sectarian schools, rather than public schools, as long as the sectarian
25.
26.

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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school meets the secular educational standards established by the
state, and denial to parents and children their choice of education may
be unconstitutional under the "free exercise" clause.
FEDERAL STATUTES PERMITTING AID
In order to promote the general welfare and national excellence, many
forms of aid to education have been given to church-related schools by
both the state and national governments. Some examples are: the
federal provision for Reserve Officer training programs leading to
Army, Air Force, Marine and Navy Commissions; 2 7 the law governing the educational cost for congressional and Supreme Court
pages; 28 national defense student loan program; 2 9 national defense
fellowships; 3 0 loans to non-profit private schools for scientific and
language equipment;31 testing students in secondary schools; 3 2 institutes for training secondary school counselors and institutes for
training modern foreign language teachers; 3 3 language and area
36
centers; 3 4 language fellowships; 35 foreign language research;
research and experimentation in more effective utilization of television, radio, motion pictures and related media; 3 7 grants for teaching in the education of mentally retarded children; 3 S cooperative research on problems in education;

39

health research project grants;40

construction of hospitals and other medical facilities; 4 1 construction
of health research facilities; 4 2 categorical training grants and
traineeship; 43 research fellowships and awards by the Public Health
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

39
60
72
72
72
72

Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.

191, 10 U.S.C. 4382 (1916).
839, 2 U.S.C. 88(a) (1946).
1583, 20 U.S.C. 421, et seq. (1958).
1591, 20 U.S.C. 464 (1958).
1590, 20 U.S.C. 445 (1958).
1592, 20 U.S.C. 484(b) (1958).

33.
34.
35.

72 Stat. 1593, 1594, 20 U.S.C. 491, 521 (1958).
72 Stat. 1593, 20 U.S.C. 511(a) (1958).
72 Stat. 1594, 20 U.S.C. 511(b) (1958).

36.
37.

72 Stat. 1594, 25 U.S.C. 512 (1958).
72 Stat. 1595, 20 U.S.C. 542 (1958).

38.

72 Stat. 1777, 20 U.S.C. 611 (1958).

39.

68 Stat. 533, 20 U.S.C. 331 (1954).

40. 58 Stat. 692, 42 U.S.C. 241(d) (1944); 69 Stat. 322, 42 U.S.C. 1857
(1955) ; 70 Stat. 499, 33 U.S.C. 466, et seq. (1956).
41. 78 Stat. 448, 42 U.S.C. 291, et seq. (1964).
42.

77 Stat. 164, 42 U.S.C. 292, et seq. (1963).

43. 62 Stat. 465, 42 U.S.C. 287 (a) (1948) ; 62 Stat. 469, 42 U.S.C. 283 (1948);
62 Stat. 598, 42 U.S.C. 288(a) (1948); 70 Stat. 929, 42 U.S.C. 242(a) (1956); 75
Stat. 825, 42 U.S.C. 289(c) (1961).
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Service; 4 4 traineeship for professional public health personnel; 4 5
advance training for professional nurses; 4 6 project grants for graduate training in public health; 4 7 Indian health-aid in construction of
community hospitals; 48 cancer control grants; 4 9 grants for research,

demonstration and training projects related to vocational rehabilitation; 50 vocational rehabilitation fellowships; 51 Social Security Administration cooperative research or demonstration projects; 5 2 Children's Bureau-special projects relating to crippled children and maternal and child health services; 5 3 surplus property utilization program by the Office of Field Administration; 5 4 special fellowships,
grants, loans, support of research, and summer institutes by the
Atomic Energy Commission; 5 5 vocational rehabilitation grants by
the Veterans Administration; 5 6 educational benefits for World War II
and Korean veterans; 5 7 war orphans' educational assistance; 58 re-

search and education in scientific fields for the National Science
Foundation; 5 9 the State Department supports educational activities
for international exchange, improvement of cultural relationships and
rendering of technical assistance to foreign countries; 6 0 the Department of Defense has a number of training and research programs; 6 1
business management research for the Small Business Administra64
3
tion; 62 national school lunch program; 6 special milk program;
44.
(1962).
45.
46.

75 Stat. 825, 42 U.S.C. 289(c)

(1961); 76 Stat. 1073, 42 U.S.C. 241(c)

78 Stat. 613, 42 U.S.C. 242(d) (1964).
70 Stat. 924, 42 U.S.C. 242(e) (1956).

47. 78 Stat. 613, 42 U.S.C. 242(g) (1964).
48. 71 Stat. 370, 42 U.S.C. 2005 (1957).
49.
50.

60 Stat. 423, 42 U.S.C. 241 (1960).
71 Stat. 488, 29 U.S.C. 34(a) (1957).

51. 41 Stat. 737, 29 U.S.C. 37(a)(3) (1920).
52.

70 Stat. 850, 42 U.S.C. 1301 (1956).

53. 49 Stat. 629, 42 U.S.C. 702(b) (1935); 49 Stat. 631, 42 U.S.C. 712(b)
(1935).
54. 63 Stat. 385, 40 U.S.C. 484(j), (k) (1949).
55. 68 Stat. 927, 42 U.S.C. 2051 (1954).
56. 72 Stat. 1171, 1172, 38 U.S.C. 1503, 1504 (1958).
57.

72 Stat. 1174, 38 U.S.C. 1601, et seq. (1958).

58. 72 Stat. 1193, 38 U.S.C. 1701, et 8eq. (1958).
59. 64 Stat. 149, 42 U.S.C. 1862(a), (2), (3), (4)
468, 42 U.S.C. 1870(c) and 1872(a) and (b) (1959).
60.
(1961);
61.
62.
63.
64.

and (b)

(1950); 73 Stat.

62 Stat. 7, 22 U.S.C. 1448 (1948); 75 Stat. 460, 22 U.S.C. 1891, et seq.
75 Stat. 538, 22 U.S.C. 1431, et seq. (1961).
72 Stat. 1793, 42 U.S.C. 1891-1893 (1958).
72 Stat. 698, 15 U.S.C. 636(d) (1958).
60 Stat. 230, 42 U.S.C. 1751 et seq. (1946).
68 Stat. 899, 7 U.S.C. 1446(c) (1954).
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forestry research; 6 5 use of national forests; 6 6 university research
67
programs for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
College Housing Loan Program. 68 The states' contributions are
primarily in the area of medical, dental and health services and examinations. The listing of these aids at the federal and state levels
is not intended to be exclusive but selective only to show that Congress and the State Legislatures have never felt that the Constitution decreed an absolute separation between the government and
church-related schools. 69
THE FORMS OF -AID
Since Congress and the states have legislative precedent to promote
the national welfare, especially education, different forms of aid to
education have been used. It is common knowledge that across-theboard grants, loans, scholarships, tuition payments, tax benefits, and
other public services, such as fire and police protection, have been
rendered. 7 0

It is the considered opinion of some legal scholars that the form of
the aid becomes important in view of the fact that there is a constitutional prohibition against the "establishment of religion." Some feel
that a building construction loan could be given, for example, but that
an across-the-board grant would be invalid. It is the opinion of some
that the form of the aid should make no difference-either all aid
71
should be allowed or all disallowed.
The grant is frequently used to promote national excellence and
education. Money is given outright, without any requirement of re65.

49 Stat. 1515, 16 U.S.C. 581 (1936).

66.

30 Stat. 36, 16 U.S.C. 479 (1897).

67.
68.

72 Stat. 429, 42 U.S.C. 2473(b) (5) (1958).
64 Stat. 77, 12 U.S.C. 1749 (1950).

69. See CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION IN
ITS VARIOUS ASPECTS, S. Doc. 29, 87 Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1961), Miscellaneous Memorandum of Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, and Opinions of Certain Scholars of the Law Relative to S. 1021 (A Bill to Authorize a
Program of Federal Assistance for Education) and Related Subjects, Submitted
upon Request of the Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare; and a Legal Analysis of the Administration's Brief on Federal Aid to Church-Supported Elementary Schools, by Senator Kenneth B.
Keating of New York.
70. Legal Department, National Catholic Welfare Conference, The Conati
tutionality of the Inclusion of Church-Related 8chools in Federal Aid to Education, 50 Geo. L.J. 397, 434 (1961).
71. Weclew, Church and State: How Much Separation, 10 Depaul L.J.
14-21 (1960).
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payment, because an institution is performing a public, educative
function. As a church-related school also performs a religious function, of course, no government funds should be used to support the
religious aspects of its education. While the allocation of these funds
to governmental and nongovernmental functions presents difficulties, these difficulties are not insurmountable in this day of modernized
accounting.
In the situation involving loans, the borrower bears the entire
burden of building the facility or, if a student, paying for his education. The money borrowed, of course, has to be repaid with low interest rates usually provided under the terms of the loan contract.
If the student ultimately learns what is demanded of him to further
national education, the condition of the loan is satisfied and the
church-related institution may now offer him something over what is
required by the government-namely, instruction in religion.
Scholarships, based on merit and need, are given outright to the
student and need not be repaid to the government. This form of aid
exists primarily for the purpose of fostering, promoting and encouraging educational excellence by the state and national governments.
It follows that the student should be free to pursue whatever subjects he desires and attend the institution of his choice.
Tuition payments are not necessarily based on merit or need but
recognition by the government that it is obliged to promote education
for those who qualify. The G.I. and the Korean Veterans Bill of
Rights furnish excellent examples of this form of aid. The money
need not be repaid by the veteran for the education received at the
public sectarian institution. Thus, church-related institutions are considered on the same basis as other accredited public schools by the
government when it grants this subsidy to veterans who entered the
military service and helped defend the nation in its hour of national
emergency.
Tax benefits, in various forms, to private educational institutions
and to the taxpayers have existed from time immemorial. The justification of this form of aid is on the basis that non-profit institutions
are performing vital public services which the government, itself,
would have to undertake. Policywise, it is more economical if this
historical tradition is perpetuated rather then curtailed. We witness
examples of these benefits when religious organizations are exempt
from state property and federal income taxes. Individual taxpayers
and business corporations may deduct a certain percentage of their
net income for contributions to religious organizations and schools.
Gifts and bequests to religious and other tax-exempt institutions are
deductible under the federal estate and gift tax laws.
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Public service benefits are usually local in nature and, also, are
varied in form. Thus, the church-related school may receive fire and
police protection, sidewalk and road improvements, sewage and water
connections, and qualify for the milk, lunch, medical and dental programs for its students.
However, if one were to speculate on the basic form of aid that
Congress will elect in assisting a church-related organization in
furthering the national educational needs, it would be safe to assume
that the indirect, rather than the direct, approach will be used. That
is, the aid would continue to be tied in with some national defense
effort, as heretofore, such as the G.I. and Korean Veterans Bill of
Rights, 7 2 or with the national welfare, such as the Federal AntiPoverty Bill.73 Whether the direct or indirect approach is sounder,
only time and the United States Supreme Court may furnish the
answer.
THEORIES:

OPPOSING AND JUSTIFYING AID

In spite of the fact that state and national aid is being given to sectarian schools, two schools of thought have emerged on the issue
whether it is or is not constitutional. Opponents of government
support to religious institutions basically object for two reasons.
The first ground is that support of religous institutions contravenes
the requirement that appropriations may only be used for a public
purpose and not for a private purpose. This interpretation is inferred
from the fourteenth and fifth amendments of the United States Constitution, which forbid the government from taking property except
by due process of law.
The second ground is that such support to religious institutions
violates the express provisions against aiding the "establishment of
religion" clause in the first amendment, which has now been read
into the meaning of "liberty" under the fourteen amendment of the
74
United States Constitution.
On the other hand, proponents for government support of sectarian
institutions advance two theories seeking to justify aid by the government. The first theory is the consideration theory, the government
appropriation is the quid pro quo, it is in the nature of payment for
72. 66 Stat. 663, 38 U.S.C. 911(6) (1952); 72 Stat. 1174, 38 U.S.C. 1601(6)
(1958).
73. 78 Stat. 520, 42 U.S.C. 2802 (1964).
74. Cushman, Public Support of Religious Education in American Contitutional Law, 45 ll. L. Rev. 333 (1950); Feliman, Separation of Church and State
in the United States: A Summary View, 1950 Wis. L. Rev. 427.
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services rendered by the institution for education which the government would have to provide. The proponents say that government is
not providing aid but rather remunerating the sectarian institution
for services furnished.
In Dunn v. Chicago IndustrialSchool for Girls,7 5 the Illinois court
recognized this theory in the case of a Catholic industrial school for
girls in which Illinois paid $16.00 monthly for the care and maintenance of each pupil sent there by the state. For the state to maintain a similar institution of its own, the cost to the state was $28.88
per pupil. The court said:
The constitutional prohibition against furnishing aid or
preference to any church or sect is to be rigidly enforced,
but it is contrary to fact and reason to say that paying less
than the actual cost of clothing, medical care, and attention,
education and training in useful and domestic sciences, is
76
aiding the institution where such things are furnished.
The second theory advanced by the proponents is the child-parent
recipient theory. The basis of this argument is that the recipient is
not the religious institution but someone else - either parent or
child. This school of thought maintains that certain types of aid
may be given to the parent or child attending church-related schools
and that this aid is to the parent or child rather than the sectarian
institution he attends. In Borden v. LouisianaState Board of Education,7 7 the Louisiana court upheld the validity of a Louisiana statute
which provided for free textbooks to parochial and public school
pupils under this theory. This statute was challenged as being unconstitutional because it provided aid to parochial schools as prohibited under the Louisiana Constitution, and as an invalid use of
tax money for a private purpose prohibited under the state and
national constitutions. In addition, this case pointed out that state
financial aid to children of a sectarian school may constitute a legitimate exercise of the state police power. The Supreme Court of
Louisiana said:
The furnishing of school books to the children of the state,
for their use, in attending school, tends directly to promote
the education of the children of the state and to obliterate
illiteracy, thereby improving the morals of the children and
promoting general welfare and safety of the people and
78
hence comes within the police power.
75.
76.

280 fI. 613, 117 N.E. 735 (1917).
Id. at 618, 117 N.E. at 737 (1917).

77.

168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929).

78.

Id. at 1022, 123 So. at 661 (1929).
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Thus, in analyzing financial assistance statutes, it is important to
determine the legislative intent and one should ask the question who
79
receives the aid - the church-related school or the parent-child?
EVALUATION OF SOME CASES
Since it is established that parents and children are free to choose a
church-related education, and benefits, as aforementioned, are being
conferred on private groups by Congress and state legislatures, it is
necessary to examine some cases which have been decided wherein
private groups received benefits and the rationale of the court in holding that "the establishment of religion" clause was or was not violated. The three leading decisions decided by the United States
Supreme Court dealing with financial aid to church-related institutions are: Bradfield v. Roberts,8 0 Cochran v. Louisiana State Board
of Education8 ' and Everson v. Board of Education of the Township
of Ewing.8 2 The clause was first invoked in Bradfield v. Roberts,
supra, where the Supreme Court sustained a federal appropriation
for the construction of two isolating buildings on the grounds owned
by Providence Hospital which was under the control of Sisters of
Charity. Under Congressional authority, the Commissioners of the
District of Columbia made an agreement with Providence Hospital
for the construction of a public ward for indigent patients sent there
by the Commissioners, and for payment by the District of Columbia
for services rendered by Providence Hospital. The United States
Supreme Court found no conflict with the "establishment of religion"
clause, but rather a valid appropriation in aid of a group of privately
incorporated individuals whose religious opinions by the members
were not subject to inquiry. Merely because the hospital was under
religious control was not sufficient basis to deny this institution
governmental aid for the public function which the institution performed.
Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, supra, established
the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute which provided, in part,
that the Board of Education was directed to furnish "school books
for school children free of cost to such children," and appropriations
were made accordingly. The United States Supreme Court upheld
the appropriations and the program providing free, secular textbooks
to students in private and parochial schools, as well as public schools,
79.

Op. cit. supra note 74.

80.

175 U.S. 291 (1899).

81.
82.

281 U.S. 370 (1930).
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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and the statute as not being objectionable under the fourteenth
amendment as a taking of private property for a private purpose.
The United States Supreme Court adopted the language of the
Louisiana Supreme Court, per Hughes, C.J.:
The appropriations were made for the specific purpose of
purchasing school books for the use of the school children
of the state, free of cost to them. It was for their benefit and
the resulting benefit to the state that the appropriations
were made. True, these children attend some school, public
or private, the latter sectarian or non-sectarian, and that the
books are to be furnished them for their use, free of cost,
whichever they attend. The schools, however, are not the
beneficiaries of these appropriations. They obtain nothing
from them, nor are they relieved of a single obligation because of them. The school children and the state alone are
the beneficiaries. . . . S
The legislation does not segregate private schools, or their
pupils, as its beneficiaries or attempt to interfere with any
matters of exclusively private concern. Its interest is education, broadly; its method, comprehensive. Individual interests are aided only as the common interest is safeguarded. 8 4
At this point, it would be germane to compare some state court
cases as precluding or allowing use of public funds to purchase textbooks or to pay a student's tuition at a sectarian school. Such a case
is Smith v. Donahue,8 5 which held the free distribution by the Board
of Education of the City of Ogdensburg, New York, of textbooks and
ordinary school supplies for the use of pupils attending at parochial
schools of the Roman Catholic church is not authorized by the New
York Education Law and is in contravention of the State Constitution, which provides that neither the state nor any subdivision thereof
shall use its property or credit or any public money directly or indirectly in aid or maintenance, other than for examination or inspection of any school or institution of learning, wholly or in part, under
the control and direction of any religious denomination or in which
any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught.
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, said:
The expression 'pupils of the school district below the
academic grade' naturally refers to the pupils of the public
school where these grades are recognized. The moneys are to
83.

281 U.S. 370, 374 (1930).

84.

Id. at 375.

85.

202 App. Div. 656, 195 N.Y.S. 715 (1922).
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be raised as other moneys for school purposes are to be
raised. They are to be used 'for the use of the pupils of the
several schools of the school district of the city and for no
other purpose.' The several schools there referred to, we
think, considering all the provisions of the Education Law,
are the public schools of the district under the control of the
board of education. No other schools are 'schools of the
school district.' There may be other schools in the district,
but they are not schools of the district; the parochial schools
are schools of the parish, restricted to the parish, and there
is nothing which implies that the books and supplies are to
be furnished to the pupils as distinguished from the school.
They are for the use of the pupils of the school district, to
be furnished to the schools by the board of education, and
they are the property of the board of education. A school
district is a district of and for the public schools; it was
authorized as such and exists as such. The school is not the
building and its equipment; it is the organization, the union
of all elements in the organization, to furnish education in
some branch of learning-the arts or sciences or literature.
It is the institution, and the teachers and scholars, that make
8 6
it up. The pupils are a part of the school.
If the language of the statute had provided for free textbooks to
the "pupils" instead of "to the pupils of the school district," this case
might have been interpreted the other way as the quoted language
intimates.
Some state cases which have been decided since Everson v. Board
of Education, supra, precluding the use of public funds to pay tuition
at sectarian schools, should be examined.
In Almond, Attorney General of Virginia, v. Day,S" the Virginia
Supreme Court held that the Virginia Appropriation Act appropriating money for the education of orphans of soldiers, sailors and
marines and providing that the sum appropriated shall be expended
for tuition, institutional fees, etc., at any educational or training institution approved by the Superintendent of Public Instruction, violates the constitutional provision prohibiting any appropriation to any
school not under public control.
. 86.

Id. at 663-664, 195 N.Y.S. at 721 (1922). Accord, Almond v. Day, 197
Va. 419, 89 S.E. 2d 851 (1955); Swart v. South Burlington Town School District,
122 Vt. 177, 167 A. 2d 514 (1961). Contra, Schade v. Allegheny County Institution District, 386 Pa. 507, 126 A. 2d,911 (1956); Opinion of the Justices, 99 N.H.
519, 113 A. 2d 114 (1955).
87. 197 Va. 419, 89 S.E.2d 851 (1955).
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The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia said:
It has been settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
'has rendered the legislature of the states as incompetent as
Congress to enact such laws.' Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303, 60 S. Ct. 900, 903, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R.
1352. See also Everson v. Board of Education, supra, 330
U.S. at page 15, 67 S. Ct. at page 511.
The payment of such items to sectarian schools as directed
or authorized by the terms of Item 210 is unconstitutional
because (1) It utilizes public funds to support religious
institutions contrary to the principles laid down in Everson
v. Board of Education, supra, 330 U.S. at page 16, 67 S. Ct.
at page 511; (2) It 'affords sectarian groups an invaluable
aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious
classes through use of the state's compulsory public school
machinery,' condemned in People of Illinois ex rel McCollum
v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212, 68 S. Ct. 461, 466,
92 L. Ed. 649; (3) It compels taxpayers to contribute money
for the propogation of religious opinions which they do not
believe. *
Since, in our opinion, Item 210 is unconstitutional and
void to the extent that it purports to authorize payments
for tuition, institutional fees, and other designated expenses
of eligible children who attend approved or designated
private schools, the writ [mandamus] prayed for is
denied.8 8
Swart v. South Burlington Town School District8 9 involved a suit
by a taxpayer against the town school district with respect to payment
of tuition for attendance of students at a Catholic high school. The
school district did not maintain a high school of its own. Pursuant to
statute, the parents were permitted to choose schools and the district
paid the tuition. Under this plan it made tuition payments to religious
denominational high schools. The court, although noting that the
district did not maintain a public high school, that the Catholic
schools had been approved by the state board of education and that
non-Catholic students were not required to attend religious instructions, concluded nevertheless that the first amendment had been
violated. The Supreme Court of Vermont said:
88. Id. at 429-430, 89 S.E.2d at 858 (1955).
89. 122 Vt. 177, 167 A.2d 514 (1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 925 (1961), sub
nom. Anderson v. Swart.
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In determining the validity of 16 V.S.A. sec. 793 the statute
must be tested by its operation and effect rather than by its
form. Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708, 51
S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357; State v. Greaves, 112 Vt. 222, 226,
22 A. 2d 497. Despite the delicate and highly important
functions entrusted to local school boards, they must perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct.
1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628, 1637, 147 A.L.R. 674. But the First
Amendment must be cautiously applied to the end that the
the agency of the state is not inadvertently forbidden from
extending a public benefit to all its citizens without regard
to religious beliefs. Everson v. Board of Education, supra,
330 U.S. at page 16, 67 S. Ct. 504. The mere fact that public
funds are expended to an institution operated by a religious
enterprise does not establish the fact that the proceeds are
used to support the religion professed by the recipient. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 298, 20 S. Ct. 121, 44 L. Ed.
168; Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281
U.S. 370, 50 S. Ct. 335, 74 L. Ed. 913, 915; Everson v. Board
of Education, supra, 330 U.S. at page 18, 67 S. Ct. 504.
The doctrine of these cases narrows our problem to this:
Does the payment of tuition to a religious denominational
school by a public entity finance religious instruction, to
work a fusion of secular and sectarian education?
Considerations of equity and fairness have exerted a
strong appeal to temper the severity of this mandate. The
price it demands frequently imposes heavy burdens on the
faithful parents. He shares the expense of maintaining the
public school system, yet in loyalty to his child and his belief
seeks religious training for the child elsewhere. But the
same fundamental law which protects the liberty of a parent
to reject the public system in the interests of his child's
spiritual welfare, enjoins the state from participating in
the religious education he has selected. See Pierce v. Society
of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070,
39 A.L.R. 468. 90
There are, on the other hand, state cases, decided since Everson v.
Board of Education, supra, sustaining payments to sectarian institutions. In Opinion of the Justices,9 1 the court held that the constitu90.
91.

Id. at 184, 167 A.2d at 518 (1961).
99 N.H. 519, 113 A.2d 114 (1955).
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tional provision that no public funds shall be applied for the use of
schools or institutions of any religious sect or denomination does not
forbid the use of public funds for scholarships and grants in aid to all
hospitals offering approved training in basic professional nursing
without regard to the auspices under which they are conducted or to
the religious beliefs of their managements, provided the funds are
devoted exclusively to the public purpose of nurses' training and
devoid of sectarian doctrine and purposes. The Supreme Court of
New Hampshire stated:
The purpose of the grant *
is neither to aid any particular sect or denomination, nor all denominations, but to
further the teaching of the science of nursing * * *. The aid

is available to all hospitals offering training in nursing without regard to the auspices under which they are conducted
or to the religious beliefs of their managements, so long as
the aid is used for nurses' training 'and for no other instruction or purpose * * *.' If some denomination incidentally derives a benefit through the release of other funds for other
uses, the result is immaterial * * *. A hospital operated
under the auspices of a religious denomination which receives funds under the provisions of this bill acts merely as
a conduit for the expenditure of public funds for training
which serves exclusively the public purpose of public health
and is completely devoid of sectarian doctrine and purposes.
This does not violate the Constitution * * *
The fundamental proposition that public moneys shall be
used for a public purpose only has not prevented the rise of
private institutions as a conduit to accomplish the public
objectives. 9 2
In Schade v. Allegheny County Institution District,9 3 the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania held that for purposes of constitutional prohibition against appropriations for charitable, educational or benevolent purposes to denominational or sectarian institutions, payments
made by an institution district, to such sectarian institutions, for
support and maintenance of neglected and dependent children, under
the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, are not "appropriations," but
rather reimbursements, and such payments could constitutionally be
made. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated:
...

the plaintiffs have failed to prove any appropriations

here, and are being made by [the Institution District] for
charitable, educational or benevolent purposes to any de92.
93.

Id. at 522, 113 A.2d at 116 (1955).
386 Pa. 507, 126 A.2d 911 (1956).
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nominational or sectarian institutions, or that any public
funds are administered through such forbidden channels,
or put under their control as an aid to such institutions.
The cost of the maintenance of neglected children either
by the State or the County is neither a charity nor a benevolence, but a governmental duty. All the plaintiffs proved was
that the monies received by the defendant institutions were
in partial reimbursement for the cost of room and board of
such minors. The services have been rendered before partial
payment on account of same was received. A considerable
part of this money is recouped by the Juvenile Court from
the parents of these minor wards. The balance of the funds
so expended are in legal effect, payments to the child,-not
the institution supporting and maintaining him or her. [See
Cochran v. Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370, 374-375 ....]
The Constitution does not prohibit the State or any of its
agencies from doing business with denominational or sectarian institutions, nor from paying just debts to them when
incurred at its direction or with its approval. Numerous
cases can be readily visualized where such situations have
occurred: i.e. payment of the bill of an injured employee to a
94
sectarian hospital.

Since these decisions indicate that the constitutions of a number of
states contain express provisions prohibiting aid, usually in the form
of appropriations for educational purposes, to any religious group or
sectarian group, parochial schools may be rendered ineligible for state
aid in many states.
Everson v. Board of Education, supra, upheld the constitutionality
of a New Jersey statute authorizing reimbursement to parents of
money expended for bus transportation of their children attending
Catholic parochial schools, and the statute was held not to violate the
provisions of the first amendment that no law shall be made "respecting an establishment of religion," its purpose being merely to provide
for the safe transportation of school children, irrespective of their
religious faith. Nor was it held to violate the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment as taxing some individuals to help other
parents carry out their personal desires of educating their children
in a church-related school.
The controlling principle established by this case is that governmental assistance in the form of reimbursed bus transportation may
94.

Id. at 512, 126 A.2d at 914.
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be rendered to parents of pupils required to attend church-related
schools under the state's compulsory education law. The decision
points out the role of the Court in the church-state relationship, which
is that the Court must weigh the utility of the social benefit conferred under the statute against the prohibition "establishing a religion" to determine if a statute is valid. The test apparently being
whether the benefit to the religious institution is merely incidental,
or direct-if the latter, it is constitutionally proscribed.
The Court, per Black, J., stated what the clause proscribes:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go
to or remain away from church against his will or force him
to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can
be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs
or disbeliefs, for church attendance, or non-attendance. No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law
was intended to create 'a wall of separation between church
and State.' 9 5
The Court then pointed out what some of the social benefits are to
which church-related schools are entitled, as being marked off from
the religious prohibition:
...
Similarly, parents might be reluctant to permit their
children to attend schools which the state had cut off from
such government services as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, public highways and
sidewalks. Of course, cutting off church schools from these
services, so separate and so indisputably marked off from
the religious function, would make it far more difficult for
the schools to operate. But such is obviously not the purpose
of the First Amendment. That Amendment requires the state
to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be
95.

330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1930).
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their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to
handicap religions than it is to favor them.9 6
Therefore, it is now established that under the fourteenth amendment a state may make provision for transportation of parochial
and private school children, as well as public school children. Again
a caveat-such state statutes may be invalid under the language of
the state constitutions. Compare Visser v. Nooksack Valley School
District No. 506, 9 7 holding a Washington statute invalid which provided that all children attending school (this includes children attending a private or parochial school) would be entitled to use the bus
transportation facilities provided by the school district because it
controverted the constitutional requirement that all schools supported
wholly or in part by public funds should be free from sectarian control, and was the establishment of religion within the meaning of the
State of Washington Constitution. 98
Two other cases worthy of note in which some benefit was received
by church-related institutions although not directly from the public
treasury or not outright financial aid are: Quick Bear v. Leupp 9 9 and
Selective Draft Law Cases.10 0
In Quick Bear v. Leupp, supra, the Supreme Court held that the
declarations by Congress in the various Indian Appropriations Acts
forbidding contracts for the education of Indians in sectarian schools
relate only to appropriations of public moneys in the United States
Treasury and do not relate to the disposition of the tribal and trust
funds which belong to the Indians, and officers of the United States
Government could not be enjoined from carrying out contracts with
sectarian schools to pay for the Indian students' tuition. The
Supreme Court held that the use of trust funds for this purpose in no
96.
97.

Id. at 17-18.
33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949).

98. Accord, Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska) (1961), cert.
denied 368 U.S. 517 (1962); State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 Atl.
835 (1934), writ of error dismissed 39 Del. 187, 197 Atl. 478 (1938); Sherrard v.
Jefferson County Board of Education, 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d 963 (1942) ; Gurney
v. Ferguson, 190 Okl. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1941); McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44,
258 S.W.2d 927 (1953); Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576,
118 A.L.R. 789, reargument denied 278 N.Y. 712, 17 N.E.2d 134 (1938); Mitchell
v. Consol. School Dist. No. 201, 17 Wash.2d 61, 135 P.2d 79, 146 A.L.R. 612 (1943) ;
State ex rel. Van Straten v. Milquet, 180 Wis. 109, 192 N.W. 392 (1923). Contra,
Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App.2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946); Board of Education of
Baltimore County v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 Atl. 628 (1938); Adams v. County
Commissioners of St. Mary's County, 180 Md. 550, 26 A.2d 377 (1942).
99. 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
100.

245 U.S. 366 (1918).
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way violated the first amendment religion clause and declined to discuss the extent to which the first amendment might forbid a similar
expenditure from the public treasury.
Selective Draft Law Cases, supra, upheld the constitutionality of
the Federal Selective Draft Law over the objection, inter alia,that the
clause exempting ministers of religion, theological students, and
members of certain religious sects whose tenets deny the moral right
to engage in war was repugnant to the first amendment as establishing or interferring with religion.
The multitudinous Congressional enactments, coupled with the decisions in Bradfield, Cochran, Everson, Quick Bear and the Selective
Draft Law Cases, are official pronouncements that Federal and state
aid have been given to church-related institutions engaged in teaching
secular and sectarian programs and which, also, are contributing to
the general welfare and promoting the national excellence. The question that has been answered by the Court in the above decisions isto whom was the aid really given?
Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Education of School District
No. 71101 and Zorach v. Clauson 0 2 are two additional cases that
must be considered because they further develop the "doctrine of
separation between church and state" but are concerned with the socalled religious "released time" programs. The cases, therefore, are
not in point because they do not involve state or national financial
assistance to sectarian institutions and deal with the second important question-was state aid given to a religious institution?
It is important to note that Mcollum v. Board of Education,supra,
decided in 1948, was the first case in which the United States Supreme
Court struck down either a state or federal statute for giving aid to a
religious group under the "establishment of religion" clause, but that
it was not a direct financial assistance statute. In this case, the petitioner alleged that under the Illinois compulsory education law, with
certain exceptions, parents were required to send their children,
aged seven to sixteen, to its tax-supported schools. The Board of
Education passed regulations permitting the students in the public
schools to attend classes in religious instruction thirty to forty-five
minutes for the lower and higher grades respectively. Classes were
taught to three separate religious groups by Protestant ministers,
Catholic priests and a Jewish rabbi. Classes were conducted in the
regular classrooms of the school building. Students who did not
choose to take the religious instructions were required to go to some
101.

333 U.S. 203 (1948).

102.

343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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other place in the school building for pursuit of their secular studies.
Students who registered for the religious instructions were required
to be present at the religious classes. Reports of their presence or
absence were to be made to their teachers and thence to their parents.
The appellant objected on the grounds that the program violated the
first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court held this program unconstitutional as violating
the first amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court
stated:
Here not only are the State's tax-supported public school
buildings used for dissemination of religious doctrines. The
State also affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that
it helps to provide pupils for their religious classes through
use of the State's compulsory public school machinery. This
is not separation of Church and State.1 0 3
In a word, the Supreme Court held that this was aid to all religious
groups prohibited by the language in the Everson v. Board of Education, supra, case.
In Zorach v. Clauson, supra, New York City had a "released time"
program, too, and under its laws and regulations, students were permitted to leave the school grounds and go to religious centers for
religious instructions and exercises. A student is released on written
request of his parents. Those not released remain in their classrooms.
The churches make weekly reports to the schools on the religious
instruction attendance. The "released time" program involved neither
religious instruction in public school classrooms nor any expenditure
of public funds. All costs, including application blanks, were paid for
by the religious organization. This case clearly differed from the
"released time" program of Illinois set out in McCollum v. Board of
Education,supra. The Supreme Court held that this program did not
violate the first amendment, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment, and distinguished McCollum v. Board of Education, supra, where classrooms were used for religious instruction and
the school machinery was used to promote religious instruction. The
majority, per Justice Douglas, makes it abundantly clear the phrase
"separation of church and state" is not to be taken in an absolute
sense and points out the constitutional criteria the Supreme Court
should adopt. The Supreme Court stated:
The First Amendment within the scope of its coverage
permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute. The First
103. Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Education of School District No.
71, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
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Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all
respects there shall be a separation of Church and State....
104

When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule
of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our
traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our
people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual
needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous
indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring
those who do believe in no religion over those who do
believe ....105
This program may be unwise and improvident from an
educational or community viewpoint. That appeal is made
to us on a theory, previously advanced, that each case must
be decided on the basis of our own prepossessions . . . . Our
individual preferences, however, are not the constitutional
standard. The constitutional standard is the separation of
Church and State. The problem, like many problems in
constitutional law, is one of degree .... 106
In contra-distinction to McCollum v. Board of Education, supra,
the Supreme Court found no prohibited aid was being given to all the
religious groups affected by this "released time" program.
Another case which fits into the very category of Mcollum v.
Board of Education, supra, is Engel v. Vitale, Jr.1 07 In this case,
parents of public school pupils brought a mandamus action to compel
members of the Board of Education to discontinue use in public
schools of an official prayer contrary to the beliefs, religions, or religious practices of themselves and their children. It was held that
the New York Board of Regents' "school prayer" as a "religious
activity," the Board of Regents was using the public school system
to encourage recitation of the prayer, though pupils were not required
to participate over their or their parents' objection, and therefore,
the State of New York adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with
the first amendment, made applicable to the states by virtue of the
fourteenth amendment, which now prohibits laws respecting an
establishment of religion.
104.

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).

105.
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Id. at 313-314.
Id. at 314.
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370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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CONCLUSION
With regard to President Johnson's proposed expanded education
program to private schools, it is interesting to note the comments of
two leading United States Senators: 10 8

WASHINGTON, Feb. 11 (AP)-Sen. Jacob K. Javits,
R-N.Y., said today that President Johnson's education program 'begs the question' of whether the federal government
may provide aid to church and private schools.
'The Administration is trying to avoid confrontation on
the church-state issue by concentrating on children of poor
families,' Javits said in a taped radio interview.
Sen. Wayne Morse, D-Ore., said on the same program
that Congress may add a provision in the education legislation making it possible for any taxpayer to file suit to test its
constitutionality....
'I assume the Administration's theory is that this avoids
the issue of straight federal aid to private or parochial
schools,' Javits said....
The issue will never be settled, Morse said until the
Supreme Court 'tells the Congress how far it can go under
the First Amendment of the Constitution.'
He said a 'judicial review amendment' may be tacked onto
the bill to 'make it possible for a school district or for a
group of taxpayers, or for that matter, a single taxpayer to
bring action to test the constitutionality of the bill.'
An inspection of the legislative enactments and an analysis of the
judicial decisions wherein aid was furnished to church-related institutions leave in their wake many unanswered questions. Undoubtedly,
greater demand for appropriations will be made by the sectarian
schools if a federal appropriation bill for public education is passed.
In this area, the Supreme Court is not writing from a clean slate but
has decided cases in which there appear to be much confusion and
conflict. What the framers of the first amendment had in mind when
they drafted the "establishment of religion" clause is one thing, but
the interpretation put on the same provision by the United States
Supreme Court is really what matters today.
108.

Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Feb. 12, 1965, p. 2, col. 7-8.
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The United States Constitution was intended to be a living document, to be interpreted in a manner to meet the practical necessities
and changed social conditions. To date, no constitutional bar has
been shown to exist for Congress to give aid to education in churchrelated schools. But whether history supports this conclusion the
people will not know until Congress passes a statute providing for aid
to private and parochial schools and puts the issue squarely before
the Supreme Court. The Court could then settle this issue on churchstate relations once and for all and remove the doubt and uncertainty
that presently exist. Under our democratic form of government, the
people would then be properly informed and could abide by the
Court's decision.

